We know that the Framers' concern was directed specifically at the exercise of legislative power. Several conclusions thus emerge from the history of the adoption of the Clause. In these cases, '(t)hat issue confronts us, and the task of resolving it is inescapably ours.' Id., at 103, 78 S.Ct., at 599. And we know also that the Clause imposes upon this Court the duty, when the issue is properly presented, to determine the constitutional validity of a challenged punishment, whatever that punishment may be. Yet we know that the values and ideals it embodies are basic to our scheme of government. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, like the other great clauses of the Constitution, is not susceptible of precise definition. Less than 15 years ago, it was again noted that '(t)he exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court.' Trop v. He was at large for three days and during that time had committed several other offenses-burglary, auto theft, and assault and battery.Р”Р„lmost a century ago, this Court observed that '(d)ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.' Wilkerson v. Jackson was a convict who had escaped from a work gang in the area, a result of a three-year sentence for auto theft. While there did not appear to be any long-term traumatic impact on the victim, she was bruised and abrased in the struggle but was not hospitalized. She could find none and a struggle ensued for the scissors, a battle which she lost and she was then raped, Jackson keeping the scissors pressed against her neck. He held scissors against the neck of the wife, demanding money. Jackson had entered the house after the husband left for work. A court-appointed psychiatrist said that Jackson was of average education and average intelligence, that he was not an imbecile, or schizophrenic, or phychotic, that his traits were the product of environmental influences, and that he was competent to stand trial. Jackson, a black, convicted of the rape of a white woman, was 21 years old. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings. The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Certiorari was granted limited to the following question: 'Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in (these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?' 403 U.S. 69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Vernon's Tex.Penal Code, Art. 69-5030 was convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann.

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